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In what follows I shall be concerned with what might be called "the 
problem of agent-centered restrictions." Briefly put: How can any 
restriction on what a person may do to promote the best states of affairs 
that concerns an act's relation to himself(for example, that it would be 
a breaking by him of his promise, or that it would be a harming by him 
of another) possibly be justified? I shall argue that while any case for 
agent-centered restrictions remains elusive as long as ethics is ap- 
proached in one, quite common way, there is another approach, one 
that begins with the idea of a responsible moral individual, that makes 
agent-centered restrictions intelligible. 
I begin in Section I by sketching a line of thought that puts enor- 
mous pressure on agent-centered restrictions in order to set the 
problem. In Section I I I  quickly review the earlier history of this 
problem in Moore, Broad, and Ross. In Section III I discuss a current 
version of the problem as posed by Samuel Scheffler, and in Section IV 
I show how some preliminary attempts to advert to individual respon- 
sibility to solve it fail. In Section V I show how deeply a theory of right 
without agent-centered restrictions conflicts with a widely held view 
about an individual's responsibility for his own moral integrity. 
Finally, in Section VI, I sketch an approach to ethical theory, one 
that can be found in Butler and Kant, that takes this view of responsi- 
bility and integrity as fundamental. Apparently no justification for 
agent-centered restrictions can be found so long as we begin by looking 
outside the moral agent - whether to states of affairs that acts bring 
about or to the nature of acts themselves considered independently of 
motivation. If we approach ethics from the outside we are led to con- 
sequentialism as a theory of right, unless, like Ross, we simply assert 
certain agent-centered restrictions as fundamental and underived. The  
alternative I sketch approaches the theory of right from the direction of 
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an account of responsible moral character. It works, as it were, from 
the inside-out. My thesis is that.this approach is much likelier to 
provide a rationale for agent-centered restrictions in its theory of  right. 
There is a way of thinking about ethics that makes consequentialism a 
very appealing position. We begin by thinking of actions as the initi- 
ating of changes in the world; actions have consequences. Some of 
these consequences are causal, but not all are. There is also a sense in 
which the state of  affairs consisting of an act's performance is a con- 
sequence of the act: had the act not been performed, the state would 
not have obtained. 
What a person ought to do, what it would be right for her to do, is 
the best thing she can do. If she does something else she does something 
worse, and surely there is more justification for doing what is better. 
We should do the best we can. 
One act is better than another if, and only if, the stales of affairs 
brought into existence by the former are better, on the whole, than the 
states produced by the latter. This may be because the former act has 
consequences, in the narrow sense, that are better than the latter; its 
causal consequences may be better. But that will be insufficient by 
itself. The latter act may partly constitute a state of affairs that is in- 
trinsically better, and its greater intrinsic value may outbalance the 
greater value of the effects of the first. So if the consequences of one act 
are better, on the whole, than those of another, then the total value it 
produces, both the intrinsic value of states it partly constitutes and that 
of further states it causes, must be greater than that of the other. An act 
is the best thing one can do just in case the value of  its consequences, 
construed broadly, is greatest. So an act is right just in case it has the 
best consequences. 
Three things should be noted about this line of thought. First, its 
conclusion is that consequentialism in the broad sense is the correct 
theory of  right. Consequentialism has perhaps more usually been 
associated with theories of the good; such as hedonism, according to 
which an act's being performed has no value in itself. On these views, 
there is nothing intrinsically bad about disloyalty, say, or good about 
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distributing resources equally, or in accordance with merit. There is 
nothing intrinsically good or bad about any act. Acts, and states of 
affairs that consist in their performance, can have only extrinsic value. 
But there is nothing in the intuitive idea that a right act brings about 
the best states that requires this view. A keeping of a promise brings 
about a promise's being kept. If that is a good thing in itself, then its 
value must be reckoned into a consequentialist calculus. To the extent 
that consequantialism as a whole has been rejected because consequen- 
tialist theories in the field have had implausibly narrow theories of 
good, that rejection must be rethought. What may appear to be 
arguments against consequentialism, and for deontology, may actually 
be arguments for a more sophisticated consequentialism. 
But what, then, is the difference between deontology and con- 
sequentialism? If every objection to consequentialism can be absorbed 
by suitable changes in its theory of good, then is there any remaining 
difference? Does the intuitive line of thought just sketched construe 
consequences so broadly that the issue is lost? The second thing to 
notice is that it does not. 
Consequentialism holds that an agent ought to do what will bring 
about the best states of affairs. The requisite value of a state of affairs is 
fundamentally independent of any relation to the agent - it is 'agent- 
neutral'. Even if the valuable state of affairs essentially includes an 
action, its value is independent of being the agent's action - of being 
his. For example, i fS 's  keeping his promise is intrinsically valuable, it 
is so independently of its being his keeping of his promise. 
Consequentialism is an agent-neutral theory of right. Deontological 
theories are not agent-neutral; they often include principles that are 
agent-centered.l For example, a deontological theory might include a 
prima facie duty to keep promises. This is different from treating 
promisekeeping as intrinsically valuable. A prima facie injunction to 
keep promises is a prima facie injunction to keep one's promises, not 
to bring about the intrinsically good state of affairs of people keeping 
their promises. 
If the intuitive line of thought sketched at the beginning tells in 
favor of consequentialism, it tells against any agent-centered theory. If 
it is right to keep my promise, then keeping my promise must be the 
best thing I can do. If it is the best thing I can do, then the state of affairs 
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of my keeping it, together with its further consequences, is best. But 
whether that state is best in the requisite sense depends in no way on its 
being my keeping my promise. There can be, consequently, no agent- 
centered prima-facie duty to keep one's promises. At best there might 
be a primafacie duty to promote promisekeeping, if that state of affairs 
is intrinsically good. 
Now it might be thought unreasonably demanding to hold that it is 
always wrong to do what will have less than optimal consequences. It is 
one thing to say that the best act brings about the best states of affairs, 
but quite another to say that anything less than the best is wrong. 2 
Thinking along these lines may lead one to conclude with Samuel 
Scheffier that it is often not wrong for a person to do what is less than 
optimific when her own projects and commitments would be suffici- 
ently sacrified by the optimific act. Scheffier proposes an 'agent- 
centered prerogative' according to which a person is permitted to 
pursue her own projects out of proportion to their agent-neutral value. 3 
Still, even if it is not always wrong not to do what will have the best 
consequences, it may still never be wrong to do what will. A weaker 
version of the initial line of thought goes in this direction. Even if it is 
not always wrong not to do the best act, it can never be wrong to do the 
best act. After all, how could the best thing one could do be wrong for 
one to do? If an act is best, then the state of affairs of its being per- 
formed is best. If it is never wrong to do what is best, then it is never 
wrong to bring about the best states. 
This, then, is the third thing to notice about the line of thought. 
While some sort of agent-centered prerogative or permission is com- 
patible with a weaker version, no agent-centered restriction or prohibi- 
tion can be, If the weaker version is correct, it can never be wrong to do 
what will bring about the best states. If so, there can be no requirement 
that is agent-centered (say, to keep one's promises, or not to harm 
others) that it is wrong to violate even when doing so would produce 
better consequences. 
The plausibility of this line of  thought poses an important challenge 
to deontological theories of  right. It is a very common way of thinking 
about ethics, and it lies behind, I believe, a recent resurgence of 
support for consequentialist theories. 4 On the one hand, it blunts past 
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criticisms of consequentialism by showing how many can be absorbed 
within the consequentialist framework. On the other hand, it 
apparently shows why what is truly distinctive about a deontological 
theory, agent-centered restrictions, cannot possibly be justified. 
The most trenchant version of the challenge can be found in 
Scheffler's The Rejection of Consequentialism. This is ironic in a way 
since Scheffier's aim is partly to reject consequentialism - or, as he 
more cautiously puts it, to argue that a rationale exists for an agent- 
centered prerogative that is independent of consequentialist considera- 
tions. He argues that a case for an agent-centered prerogative can be 
mounted on the basis of  two considerations: one, that our motivations 
naturally arise from our own personal points of view, and, two, that a 
theory of right that directly 'reflects' this with an agent-centered pre- 
rogative is a 'rational response' to that fact. 
Scheffier's challenge to deontology is that the justification for an 
agent-centered prerogative provides no rationale for any agent- 
centered restriction (the 'independence thesis'), and, moreover, that 
there is reason to think that no justification of any kind can be given for 
agent-centered restrictions (the 'asymmetry thesis'). He canvasses 
various proposed justifications and concludes that they all fail. 
The debate between consequentialism and deontology has been con- 
tinuous in moral philosophy, in some form or other, since the eight- 
eenth century British moralists. But it is, I believe, only in this century 
that it has been cast in terms of agent-neutrality versus agent- 
centeredness in the theory of right. The first place t know this dialectic 
to have arisen is in connection with the consequentialism, or as he 
called it "ideal utilitarianism," advanced by G. E. Moore in Principia 
Ethica. Moore's consequentialism is of the sophisticated variety; Ross 
called it "the culmination of all the attempts to base rightness on 
productivity of some sort of  result."5 Because of its pluralistic theory of 
good, Moore's theory of right resists some deontological criticisms of 
simpler consequentialisms. And, more important for contemporary 
consequentialists, it shows the resources that a sophisticated con- 
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sequentialism has available. Moreover, Moore articulated, perhaps 
more clearly than anyone, the underlying rationale for consequen- 
tialism. 
Moore's general argument against deontology, as well as his famous 
"refutation" of egoism, are versions of the intuitive line of thought 
with which we began. Both egoism and deontology are agent-centered 
theories. Egoism maintains that each ought to advance his own happi- 
ness, and deontology includes duties that are agent-centered. Moore's 
argument against each was the same. If a person ought to do some- 
thing, then it must be good, indeed best, that he so act. The act must 
promote something with intrinsic value. Perhaps it is the act itself, pei'- 
haps some further consequence of the act. In either case, if that state of 
affairs is good, there will be the same reason for others to produce it as 
there is for the agent. So, against egoism: there can only be a reason for 
someone to advance her happiness if her being happy, or acting for the 
sake of it, is good absolutely. But if that is so, then others will have the 
same reason to promote that state of affairs, and she will have the same 
reason to act similarly with respect to others. And against deontology: 
there can only be a reason for a person to fulfill some (apparently 
agent-centered) duty if her doing so is good, indeed best. But if it is 
good that she do so, then others will have the same reason to promote 
that state of affairs, as will she to promote their so acting. So there is no 
agent-centered duty. At best there are intrinsically good acts the per- 
formance of which every agent has a reason to promote. 
It is plain that when we assert that a certain action is our absolute duty, we are asserting 
that the performance of that action at that time is unique in respect of value. But... its 
value cannot be unique in the sense that it has more intrinsic value than anything else in 
the world; since every act of duty would then be the best thing in the world, which is ... a 
contradiction. It can, therefore, be unique only in the sense that the whole world will be 
better, if it be performed, than if any possible alternative were taken. 6 
Although Moore did not put his argument in terms of agent- 
centeredness and agent-neutrality, C.D.  Broad later noted that this 
was its thrust. He characterized what he called Moore's "ethical 
neutralism" in this way: 
Ethical neutralism assumes that there is a certain one state of affairs - "the sole good" - at 
which everyone ought to aim as an ultimate end. Differences in the proximate ends of 
different persons can be justified only in so far as the one ultimate end is best secured in 
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practice by different persons aiming, not directly at it, but at different proximate ends of a 
more limited kind] 
Actually,  since sophisticated consequential ism has a pluralistic theory  
of  good, it would be more correct  to say that it provides one ranking of  
states of  affairs, and that agents ought to do whatever  will bring about  
the best states of  affairs as determined by that ranking. 
Broad went on to point  out  that Moore 's  argument  against egoism, 
and he could have added, his argument  against agent-centered deontol-  
ogy, depended on this commi tmen t  to ethical neutralism. But was ethi- 
cal neutral ism a premise or a conclusion for Moore? In Principia it is 
more natural  to think of  it as a conclusion derived from a deeper  
premise: namely,  that  if  an act is a duty, if it is right to perform it, then 
that must  be because performing it is "un ique  in value."  If an act is 
right, then it is best. And  "in asserting that the act is the best thing to 
do, we assert that it together with its consequences presents a greater 
sum of  intrinsic value than any possible alternative. ''8 For  the Moore  
of Principia, there is only one fundamental  ethical notion,  the good, or 
intrinsic value, and the fight can be defined in terms of  it. 
Ross also noticed the agent-neutrali ty of  Moorean  consequen- 
tialism, though not in so many  words, and pointed out the sharp con- 
trast with his own deontological theory of  prima facie duties. And 
recognizing what led Moore  in this direction, he steadfastly refused to 
follow. 
Against Moore,  Ross argued that the agent's specific context,  his 
relations to others, the history of  his past acts and of  others '  acts 
towards him, and his special relationship to himself, are all directly 
relevant to what it would be right for him to do. Moore 's  theory,  he 
argued, 
seems to simplify unduly our relations to our fellows. It says, in effect, that the only moral 
ly significant relation in which my neighbours stand to me is that of being possible benefi- 
ciaries by my action. They do stand in this relation to me, and this relation is morally 
significant. But they may also stand to me in the relation of promisee to promiser, of 
creditor to debtor, of wife to husband, of child to parent, of friend to friend, of fellow 
countryman to fellow countryman, and the like. 9 
Strictly speaking, Ross's criticism is a bit wide of  the mark. For  while 
Moore  called himself  an "ideal ut i l i tar ian,"  he did not  hold that an act 
is right only if it maximizes total net benefit. A right act maximizes 
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intrinsic value. And Moore held that friendship, or at any rate, per- 
sonal affection, is among the things that have intrinsic value. So he 
held that that relation does have moral significance. And he could have 
held, and still remained a consequentialist, that all of the relations 
Ross mentions have intrinsic moral significance. That is, the 
flourishing of each of these relations might be held to have intrinsic 
value and to be worth promoting for its own sake. 
Ross's criticism becomes clearer when we read the rest of his last 
sentence. 
and each of these relations is the foundation of a prima facie duty, which is more or less 
incumbent on me according to the circumstances of the case. 1~ 
Ross's view was not that since these relationships are intrinsically 
valuable there is moral reason for every person to promote them.. 
Rather, he held that the fact a person is himself related to others in 
various ways creates primafacie duties, to care for his children, to be 
loyal to his friends, to keep his promises, and so on. Moore's view was 
that no relation was relevant in an agent-centered way. 
But how did Ross resist the line of thought that led to Moore's 
neutralist consequentialism - the line from fight act, to best available 
act, to act productive of the most intrinsic value? Ross maintained that 
" ' r ight" does not stand for a form of value at all. ''~1 Moore's mistake 
was to suppose that an act's being the right thing to do just is its being 
productive of the most intrinsic value. As against Moore, Ross argued 
that the concept of right is no less fundamental to ethics and irreduc- 
ible than Moore had argued that of intrinsic value to be. Once he had 
opened a logical space between claims about intrinsic value and claims 
about what it is right or wrong to do, Ross was in a position simply to 
assert the common sense position that agent-centered characteristics of 
acts can be right- or wrong-making - that, for example, its being a 
betrayal of one's close friend is directly relevant to whether an act 
would be fight or wrong. 
When sophisticated consequentialists objected that a pluralistic 
theory of right, with no unifying rationale', was arbitrary and un- 
motivated, Ross replied that he was in no worse a position with respect 
to the objection than those who generally made it, since they also held 
pluralistic theories, allbeit of the good. This reply is especially strong 
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when made to a sophisticated consequentialist whose theory of the 
good itself seems formulated expressly to meet deontological criticisms 
of simpler versions. 
III 
That agent-centered restrictions have the support of common sense is 
generally not in dispute. If there is a burden to be carried at the level of 
considered judgments about specific cases it certainly belongs to the 
neutral consequentialist. The "problem" of agent-centered restrictions 
is that there is no apparent rationale for them. The intuitions that 
support them remain, as Schemer has put it, "intuition[s] in search of a 
foundation." (112) 
It is at the level of deeper justification that consequentialism 
appears to be in a stronger position. At least we can identify an intui- 
tive line of thought that underlies it. Like Ross, the deontologist may 
choose to reject this line of thought. He may urge that an act's being 
right and the state of affairs of its being performed being best are differ- 
ent things. Being right, he may say, is not a form of value. And he may 
insist, as did Ross, that there are agent-centered primafacie duties. But 
even if he can defend his position, he may be unable to say what is 
deeply appealing about it. That is "the problem." 
Schemer puts the problem in this way. He considers a specimen 
agent-centered restriction, R, against harming innocent others. He 
then asks us to 
suppose that if Agent A 1 fails to violate ... R by harming some undeserving person P1, 
then five other agents, A 2 ... A 6, will each violate restriction R by identically harming five 
other persons, P2 -.. P6 who are just as undeserving as P1, and whom it would be just as 
undesirable from an impersonal standpoint to have harmed. (84) 
What, he asks, could be the rationale for holding it to be wrong for A1 
to violate R in such a case? 
Now it might seem implausible that the debate between consequen- 
tialism and deontology should come down to this question. The situa- 
tion seems contrived, and it may be difficult to see what hangs on it. 
But there is a point to the question. 
The point, to a first approximation, is that unless R has the feature 
that it is wrong to violate it even if doing so would bring about fewer 
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violations, then R can be fully captured within an agent-neutral con- 
sequentialism that holds acting contrary to R to be intrinsically dis- 
valuable. If it is wrong for one to violate R even though that would lead 
to fewer violations of R, then R is inconsistent even with a neutral con- 
sequentialism that holds violations of R to be intrinsically bad. 
Two things about the question deserve further comment, however. 
First, as Scheffler certainly realizes, an agent-centered deontological 
theory need not be committed to absolutism. That is, it can include 
agent-centered restrictions that are primafacie and that are overridden 
by other considerations, both agent-centered and agent-neutral. So 
Ross held, for example, that there is a prima Jacie duty to keep one's 
promise, but other prima facie duties as well that can conflict with it, 
both agent-centered duties, such as those on one's family, community, 
and so on, and agent-neutral duties such as the general duty of benefi- 
cence. 
The point is that there is nothing magic about the number five in 
Schemer's question. R might be an agent-centered restriction even if it 
would not be wrong to violate it to prevent five violations. What 
matters is that the wrongness of violating R not be reducible to the dis- 
value of its being violated. This could be true even if it would not be 
wrong to violate it to prevent four violations; or three. In fact, it could 
be true even if it would not be wrong to violate it to prevent two viola- 
tions. This is so because its being justifiable to violate it in that case 
need not consist in the violation's producing more value. 
This is the second thing to notice. It would be sufficient for R to be 
an agent-centered restriction, the wrongness of violating which is 
irreducible to the agent-neutral intrinsic disvalue of its being violated, 
if it would be wrong to violate R when doing so would promote greater, 
or equal, value. But this could be true at the same time that it would 
not be wrong to violate R to prevent two violations. T o  see this 
suppose that a violation of R would prevent one other violation of R. 
In this case an agent-neutral consequentialism will hold that, other 
things equal, there is nothing to choose between abiding by R oneself, 
thereby bringing it about that another person violates R, and violating 
R oneself, thereby preventing the other from violating R. Each viola- 
tion would be an equally bad occurrence. From the point of view of an 
agent-neutral consequentialism it simply does not matter whether the 
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intrinsically bad consequence is one's violation of R or another 
person's. If a theory holds that that does make a difference, that it 
matters to what one should do whether it will be one or someone else 
violating R, then R will be an agent-centered restriction. So it is not 
necessary for R to be an agent-centered restriction that it be wrong to 
violate it even to prevent two violations. It is sufficient that it be wrong 
to violate it to prevent one exactly similar violation by someone else. 
That said, I intend to make nothing hang on it. It does seem to make 
the job of justifying agent-centered restrictions less onerous, but the 
fundamental problem still remains: if the state of affairs of someone's 
violating an agent-centered restriction would be better, why would it 
be wrong for her to violate it? 
Scheffler's challenge is that while a justification for an agent- 
centered prerogative can be identified in the "independence of the 
personal point of view," none can be identified for any agent-centered 
restrictions. An agent-centered prerogative does not conflict with the 
intuitive iclea that it cannot be wrong to perform an act when so acting 
would be part of the best state of affairs that could occur. 
Iv 
As I indicated earlier, my proposal will be that a rationale for some 
form of agent-centered restrictions is likelier to emerge if we approach 
ethics from the point of view of individual moral responsibility. In 
some form or other this suggestion is not new, and Scheffler explicitly 
considers a version of it. It is instructive to see why various versions are 
nonstarters. 
Bernard Williams pointed out over a decade ago that consequential- 
ism includes a doctrine of negative responsibility: 
if I am ever responsible for anything, then I must be just as much responsible for things 
that I allow or fail to prevent, as I am for things that I myself, in the more everyday 
restricted sense, bring about.12 
But, he also noted, common sense recognizes an important difference 
between consequences that would not have occurred if the agent had 
acted differently, but whose occurence is the direct result of some other 
person's action, and direct consequences of the agent's own acts. On a 
neutral consequentialism, however, all that matters for what a given 
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agent, S, should do in some circumstance are the values of Vi, associ- 
ated with each possible act Ai, in the conditional: I fS  had done Ai, then 
states of affairs with value Vi would have obtained. It is simply irrele- 
vant whether the causal chain goes through other agents' acts. 
There is a sense, then, in which on a neutral consequentialism, one 
is as responsible for bad consequences of others' acts one could have 
prevented, but did not, as one is for bad consequences resulting directly 
from acts of one's own. It simply follows from agent-neutrality that 
whether consequences result directly from the agent's act is irrelevant 
to its being right or wrong. Of  course, whether a person should be hem 
equally responsible for indirect as for direct consequences will be a 
different question for the consequentialist. That will depend on the 
consequences of further acts involved in holding people responsible. 
Scheffier considers an attempt to motivate agent-centered restric- 
tions by pointing to the common sense idea that one is responsible for 
the direct effects of one's acts in a way that one simply is not for the 
effects of the acts of others that one could have prevented. His response 
is quite reasonable: there is no question that the doctrine of negative 
responsibility is implausible at the level of common sense, but that is 
not the issue. The issue is whether there exists some deeper rationale 
for rejecting it. So far the assertion that people are more responsible for 
the direct consequences of their acts is no deeper than the assertion 
that they have no similar duty to prevent the bad consequences that 
would directly result from the acts of others. To assert the former is 
virtually to assert the latter; it does not justify it. 
A second strategy might be to argue that neutral consequentialism is 
inconsistent with respect for persons as independent responsible moral 
agents. Since it holds the consequences of others' acts to be relevant to 
the rightness of a given act to the extent that the latter can affect the 
former, neutral consequentialism appears simply to 'look through' or 
disregard the moral agency of any person other than the agent whose 
act is being evaluated as right or wrong. To the extent that moral agents 
internalize a neutral consequentialism they will then have a way of 
regarding others that might be thought morally pernicious. Con- 
sequentialism apparently requires that one simply assume responsibil- 
ity for others in an obnoxious way. Even God is thought to do no 
wrong in leaving us free to act in ways that have ill effects. True, one 
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would not want an ethic to recommend simple quiescence in the face 
of evil potentially resulting from the acts of others. But the other 
extreme, that a person regard preventable bad consequences of the acts 
of others as warranting intervention in every case in which it would be 
warranted were the consequences the direct result of her own acts, 
seems unpalatable also. That seems inconsistent with respect for others 
as independent moral agents. 
There is, however, a sort of respect for autonomy that a neutral con- 
sequentialism can recognize. A sophisticated consequentialist can hold 
that autonomy is intrinsically valuable - to respect it is to promote it. If 
so, neutral consequentialism can hold interference with others' agency 
to be intrinsically disvaluable, other things equal, thereby avoiding the 
unpalatable extreme without an agent-centered restriction. 
There is justification for an agent-centered restriction only if there is 
justification not simply for weighing in the intrinsic disvalue of inter- 
ference, but for a restriction the violation of which is not warranted by 
an increase in value even when the intrinsic value of autonomy is 
taken into account. And the intrinsic obnoxiousness of regarding 
others simply as the conduit of one's own agency does not evidently 
provide any justification for that. If neutral consequentialism is to be 
rejected because it conflicts with respect for others as independent 
responsible agents, therefore, deeper considerations will have to be~ 
marshalled. 
Finally, one might try to argue against what Scheffier calls the 
'independence thesis', against, that is, his claim that the rationale he 
provides for an agent-centered prerogative does not also justify any 
agent-centered restriction. The prerogative, recall, permits agents to 
devote energy and attention to their own projects and commitments 
out of  proportion to the (objective) value of their doing so. And its 
rationale according to Scheffier is that most of our projects and 
commitments naturally develop from within our own personal points 
of view. We become committed to particular pursuits, people, 
communities, and so on, as a result of our own individual personal 
histories. Scheffier argues that a theory of right should directly reflect 
that fact with a prerogative. The best that a sophisticated consequen- 
tialist can do is a 'consequentialist dispensation' that gives intrinsic 
value to person's pursuit of their own commitments and projects, but 
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that does not permit them to pursue them when they could promote 
more self-realization by others by sacrificing their own projects. 
When one considers what an ethical theory with an agent-centered 
prerogative, so justified, but without any agent-centered restrictions, 
would look like, the result may seem unstable. How can there be a 
justification for a prerogative, but none for a restriction on interference 
with its exercise? Won't  the theory both permit agent A to pursue a 
nonoptimific personal commitment but require agent B to prevent A 
from doing so if that would be optimific, assuming that forbearing 
interference is not covered by B's prerogative? The idea of a preroga- 
tive suggests the idea of a morally protected sphere of personal action, 
but without an accompanying restriction on the acts of others, the 
sphere will not be protected against morally sanctioned interference. 
The situation is analogous to that considered just above. A neutral 
consequentialist can treat autonomy, or self-realization, as intrinsical- 
ly valuable. This value, then, can be weighed in determining whether 
interference with another's exercise of his prerogative would have the 
best consequences. Because the value is agent-neutral, however, there 
will be no case for failing to interfere with A if doing so is necessary to 
prevent yet greater interference with others. But even if the independ- 
ence of the personal standpoint justifies an agent-centered prerogative, 
and not merely a consequentialist dispensation, it is hard to see why it 
justifies an agent-centered restriction on interference rather than a 
neutral consequentialism that gives intrinsic value to self-realization 
and intrinsic disvalue to interference. There is at least some plausibil- 
ity to the view that the importance of the personal standpoint provides 
a rationale for persons having some freedom to pursue their own 
personal projects even when their doing so is at some cost to general 
self-realization. But when we shift from the agent exercizing the 
prerogative to others, the importance of the personal standpoint 
provides no apparent rationale for restricting others from interfering 
when doing so would promote greater self-realization. An agent- 
centered restriction on interference seems unmotivated. 
v 
It seems, then, that no rationale for agent-centered restrictions emerges 
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in any simple and direct way from considerations of responsibility, 
respect for others as responsible agents, or the independence of the 
personal standpoint. There is a way of  conceiving of  each of  these 
within a fundamental rationale that leads to neutral consequentialism 
and away from any agent-centered restriction. If there is something 
about responsible moral agency that provides a justification for agent- 
centered restrictions it will apparently have to be framed within a 
wholly different line of thought. 
In the next section I will sketch a fundamental approach to ethics on 
which agent-centered restrictions are, as such, unproblematic, and 
contrast it with the line of thought leading to consequentialism. The 
latter begins with a view about the intrinsic value of states of affairs 
conceived independently of any moral evaluation of conduct or 
character, while the point of departure of the alternative I shall suggest 
is a fundamental view of character, moral integrity, and of responsibili- 
ties relating to these. To put it in a rough and preliminary way, moral 
integrity involves a person's guiding his life by his own moral judg- 
ment, properly understood, and the fundamental responsibility of the 
moral life is the maintenance of integrity, so conceived. Instead of 
beginning outside the moral agent with a view about states of affairs 
that are intrinsically worthy of promotion, the alternative begins inside 
the moral agent with a view about moral character and integrity. The 
rationale for agent-centered restrictions is itself agent-centered. 
To prepare the way for a discussion of this approach I want first to 
consider how consequentialists are bound to view the proper relation 
of integrity and character to what a person ought to do. 
To begin with, because on a neutralist view the history of a person's 
own conduct is not directly relevant to what she should do, there is a 
sense in which a person bears no direct responsibility for what she has 
done. Her own past conduct leaves no directly relevant trace in deter- 
mining what she should subsequently do, since were it to do so it would 
have to be via an agent-centered restriction. Neutral consequentialism 
thus rejects any special duty to try to comprehend, understand, or 
come to grips with, one's own past conduct, and by doing so to repair 
moral integrity. Of course, a neutralist can explain why we should do 
this on many occasions, so that we will be better able to maximize 
intrinsic value. But we have no special responsibility for our past in the 
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sense that what we should do is intrinsically unaffected by what we 
have done. 
Neutral consequentialism does hoId that a person has a special 
responsibility for her acts at the time of their performance, that she does 
not have for the acts of others, in at least one sense. A theory of right 
action just is a theory of what a person is responsible for doing given 
what, at the time of action, she has it in her power to do. To act 
contrary to the theory is to do wrong and, in this sense, to fail to 
discharge one's moral responsibility. 
But consequentialism denies that a person has a special responsibil- 
ity for her character or integrity in the sense that it denies that con- 
siderations regarding her character and integrity are in any way direct- 
ly relevant to what she should do. It denies that the consequences of  
acts for her character are any more relevant in themselves to what she 
should do than are consequences for the character of others. It denies 
that an act's constituting a diminishing of her moral integrity, or a 
violation of her own principles and values, is any more intrinsically 
relevant to what she should do because it is her own moral integrity 
that is at stake. And it denies that a person has any but a contingently 
instrumental obligation to take thought of what she has done and is 
doing in her life, to "bear [her] own survey," in Hume's phrase, and 
conduct her life in a way of which she can on honest reflection 
approve. 
A vivid example will be helpful. In a recent essay Tomas E. Hill, Jr. 
describes "an artist o'f genius and originality" who "paints a master- 
work unappreciated by his contempararies," but who "cynically, for 
money and social status," and with some self-disgust, "alters the 
painting to please the tasteless public and then turns out copies in 
machine-like fashion. ''~3 HilI argues that there is a well understood 
sense in which the artist fails to respect himself: he fails to "live by a set 
of  personal standards by which [he] is prepared to judge [himself]." 14 
Suppose, however, that the story continues. There is another 
similarly talented artist who is bent on pursuing the same path, but the 
spectacle of  the first artist so sickens him that he decides he cannot do 
it, and does not. So the consequence of the first artist's conduct is the 
loss of his integrity, but the prevention of the loss of the other's. A 
neutral consequentialism will hold that it makes no difference to what 
A G E N T - C E N T E R E D  R E S T R I C T I O N S  307 
the first artist should have done that it violated his integrity. A loss of 
integrity is a loss of integrity. Other things equal, there was no moral 
reason for him not to sell out that did not also exist for him to prevent 
the other's selling out. 
Two clarificatory remarks are in order at this point. Though neutral 
consequentialism is indeed committed to these counterintuitive propo- 
sitions about what it is right to do, the neutralist may respond that we 
find these propositions counterintuitive partly because we run together 
matters of right and wrong with matters of praise and blame, evalua- 
tions of acts and evaluations of agents. That the first artist does no worse 
wrong in violating his own integrity than he would in failing to prevent 
another from violating his, does not mean that he should be judged the 
same in both cases. Evaluations of acts as right or wrong is a wholly 
different matter from evaluating persons. For various reasons, it could 
be argued, lack of self-respect is a worse trait of character than is un- 
willingness to prevent another's loss of self-respect if it requires losing 
one's own respect. 
Also, the neutralist insists, we must distinguish between subjective 
and objective rightness - between which act is right given what would 
actually have happened, and what act would have been right judged 
relatively to what the agent believed or could reasonably have 
believed, that is, on the assumption that those beliefs were true. The 
first artist's act may have been, objectively, no worse than his keeping 
his moral integrity intact if that would in fact have led to the other's 
compromising of himself. Nonetheless, if he was ignorant of this con- 
sequence his act was subjectively wrong. 
For reasons that will become apparent in the next section, I am 
skeptical that evaluations of acts and agents should be kept separate in 
the way the consequentialist insists. The point is not that we cannot 
distinguish, at least in many cases, between what act a person should 
perform, regardless of motive, and how an agent is to be appraised for 
performing it from some particular motive, some particular set of 
beliefs, and so on. My point will be that one can approach the theory of 
right, in a general way, from a view of moral character. 
Second, concern about personal integrity may lead one to think, 
along with Scheffler, that what consequentialism requires is simply an 
agent-centered prerogative that protects action for such ends. But the 
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sort of integrity with which I am concerned is not Williams' identifica- 
tion of a person with his 'ground projects', alienation from which is 
threatened by neutral consequentialism. 15 My concern is with moral 
integrity, a person's responsibility to live by principles he can reflec- 
tively accept, and, consequently, not to do what is wrong by his own 
lights. Here a prerogative will be insufficient. 
v I  
The line of thought leading to consequentialism begins, as I said, out- 
side the moral agent with a view about the intrinsic value of states of 
affairs. It then works its way inside, first with a theory of fight action, 
and then with a theory of moral character. Acts are fight if they 
maximize the value of states of affairs. A character trait is good if 
inculcating it maximizes valuable states or, perhaps, if praising it does 
so. In this progression of external to internal, acts are the natural 
midpoint. They are the effect of internal causes or, less committally, 
the output of creatures with a certain internal constitution. But they 
are individuated independently of their specific internal cause or 
motive. And, for the consequentialist, their signal feature is that they 
are part of an objective external order; they partly constitute and bring 
about states of affairs. So acts have both an external and an internal 
aspect. 
We may say, then, that the consequentialist approaches moral 
theory from the outside-in. From some basic premises about intrinsi- 
cally valuable states of affairs, he builds both his theories of conduct 
and of character. 
Now because, on this approach, both conduct and character are 
evaluated by their respective relation to valuable states, there is an 
important sense in which consequentialist appraisals of them are 
instrumental. Conduct is fight if it brings about the best states of 
affairs. A trait is part of good character if it reliably produces the best 
states. 
This may seem to be blunted by the sophisticated consequentialist's 
holding that the performance of an action, or the having or expressing 
of a character trait, may be good in itself; but that is only partly true. 
While a sophisticated consequentialism can hold acts and traits to be 
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part of, and not simply means to, intrinsically good states, it will hold 
that a person should perform such an act, or that such a trait is a 
virtuous one, only if they bring about states with the most value 
overall. Thus a given act held to be intrinsically good will only be 
something one should do, or an intrinsically good trait be part of  good 
moral character, if there is no other act or trait available that would 
produce even more value. 
The point is really the same as the "problem of agent-centered 
restrictions." Even if we think of a character trait as good in itself, there 
will be a rationale for a person's having it only if that will bring about 
the most valuable states. If her having some quite contrary trait, even 
one held by the consequentialist to be an essential part of  a state that is 
bad in itself, would promote greater value, say, if it would promote 
more people having the intrinsically good trait, then the "evil" trait 
will be the one the person should have, and she will be a better person 
for having it. 
Approaching ethics from the outside-in forces one to treat moral 
character as derivative and instrumental. And that suggests a different 
approach. What I shall call the Butler/Kant view turns the line of 
thought leading to consequentialism on its head. It begins not with a 
view about the value of states of affairs but with a very general theory 
of moral character. It then proceeds to work toward a theory of 
conduct from its theory of character. 
It is, I think, significant that both Butler and Kant held deontologi- 
cal normative positions. Kant, of course, is the paradigmatic deontol- 
ogist. But Butler may seem harder to peg since, like many eighteenth 
century British moralists, he rarely addressed the question of what to 
do considered independently of motive. He did not have a theory of 
right properly so called. Nonetheless, in arguing that the virtues cannot 
simply be resolved into benevolence he anticipated what were to 
become stock objections to consequentialism: that "fraud," "vio- 
lence," and "treachery" can be wrong, even when their overall con- 
sequences are good, and "fidelity" and "strict justice" right though 
their overall consequences be bad. 16 
Had they been faced with the categories of agent-centered and 
agent-neutral there is little doubt that both Butler and Kant would 
have accepted agent-centered restrictions and rejected any wholly 
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agent-neutral theory of right. So much is familiar and uncontroversial. 
What is less appreciated is that these philosophers shared a fundamen- 
tal approach to moral philosophy, one based on a conception of moral 
integrity and character, that offers hope of a rationale for agent- 
centered restrictions. 
Very roughly put, the notion that is common to Butler and Kant is 
that to be subject to morality is to have a complex moral capacity, the 
having of which creates a fundamental responsibility to lead one's life 
in a way that exercises it. Exercising this capacity, moreover, is both 
essential to good character and constitutive of  moral integrity. 
The common notion, therefore, is of a sort of competence that is 
constitutive of character and integrity and which there is a fundamen- 
tal responsibility to exercise. Thus on this view there is a link between 
character and right conduct that is not derivative from their respective 
relations to some third thing, in particular to states of affairs held to be 
intrinsically good. Persons ought to conduct themselves in ways neces- 
sary to maintain their moral integrity. 
The requisite competence is a complex of capacities: (a) to be aware, 
not only of situations confronting one, but also of  the sorts of motives 
or reasons, ('maxims', in Kant's term, 'principles', in Butler's) that 
might move one to act in them, (b) to reflect in a certain way, and from 
a certain point of view, on the idea of a person's acting on a given 
reason or principle in a kind of situation (for Kant, by considering 
whether one could will that everyone act on the reason), (c) to take an 
attitude toward acting-on-that-reason-in-that-sort-of-situation on the 
basis of the appropriate reflection, a reflective attitude or choice that 
constitutes a judgment of so acting, and (d ) to  regulate one's own 
conduct by that judgment.17 
For both Butler and Kant, the person of good character is one who 
guides his life by exercising the complex competence necessary to be 
subject to moral demands, a competence, more or less, for independent 
moral judgment. Only beings with this capacity, Butler argued, can be 
moral agents in the strictest sense, and by virtue of it all moral agents 
are "a law unto themselves."18 
Kant, of course, held that conduct expresses good character only if it 
issues from the agent's own sense of what she should do. Otherwise, no 
matter how intrinsically "amiable" the motive of a person's act is, it 
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will, seen from the agent's own point of view, lead her to do what she 
should do only "if  fortunate enough to hit on something beneficial or 
right."19 It will not express moral self-government. 2~ 
The motivation for the Butler/Kant view of moral character is not, 
as on the outside-in line of thought, that having it leads to intrinsically 
valuable states of affairs. The inside-out approach is compatible with, 
indeed congenial to, a profound skepticism that states can have the sort 
of intrinsic value they must be able to have on the outside-in approach. 
A theory of conduct can be justified from the outside-in only if states 
can have an intrinsic worth-bringing-aboutness that not only creates a 
prima facie justification for any moral agent to promote them regard- 
less of his specific motivational and affective susceptibilities. It must 
also provide justification for thinking it prima facie wrong for him to 
fail to promote it. 21 
The inside-out view of character is motivated, rather, by the 
thought that this is what character must be if a person can be respon- 
sible for her own moral integrity simply by virtue of having the power 
to constitute it. Thus Butler: "[W]e are agents. Our constitution is put 
in our own power. We are charged with it; and therefore are account- 
able for any disorder or violation of it". 22 
The Butler/Kant approach is agent-centered at the outset. It begins 
with the idea that each person is responsible for her own moral integ- 
rity. But how is agent-centeredness at this level likely to be translated 
into a theory of right? There are, I think, reasons to expect agent- 
centeredness of at least two different kinds in a theory of right justified 
from the inside-out along Butler/Kant lines. 
First, because it begins with the proposition that agents bear a 
responsibility for their own moral integrity that they do not for that of 
others, it will follow that persons have a duty not to compromise their 
own moral integrity that they do not have to do what would prevent 
others from compromising theirs. From the outside-in a loss of moral 
integrity is a loss of moral integrity. But from the inside-out it is the 
agent's own moral integrity that is his fundamental responsibility. 
Now this duty, though fundamental on the inside-out view, is 
second-order. An agent violates his moral integrity by doing things he 
would authentically judge wrong. Ordinarily, however, we think of a 
theory of fight as addressed to the level of the agent's first order 
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thoughts. True as this doubtless is, an inside-out view must hold there 
to be a genuine second-order duty not to do what one honestly thinks 
wrong using one's own best judgment, even, indeed, when one's first- 
order judgment is mistaken. Acting contrary to one's best judgment 
threatens moral integrity even if the first-order judgment is mistaken. 
But is there any reason to think that approaching a theory of fight in 
the Butler/Kant way, from the inside-out, will lead to agent-centered 
restrictions at the first-order level? There is, in fact, a very interesting 
reason for expecting that it would. 
If we approach the theory of conduct from the outside-in then we 
think we have a rationale for evaluating acts by their relation to valu- 
able states of affairs. What matters to us is which states of affairs would 
actually be brought about by the act. 
If we approach the theory of conduct from the inside-out, however, 
our focus will rather be on the principles, considerations, or reasons 
that persons should be guided by in their deliberations about and 
choice of acts. Whether an act is right will depend on whether it is 
recommended by principles or considerations that would weigh with a 
person of good character. 
Consequentialists are at pains to distinguish between criteria of right 
and wrong and considerations that should be taken account of in 
deliberation and choice. Their theory concerns the former and not the 
latter. In fact, they are often quick to point out that while the theory of 
right is agent-neutral, a consequentialist theory ofdecisionmaking may 
well dictate that persons take account of agent-centered considerations 
in deciding what to do. The best consequences may be produced only 
indirectly, that is, if persons guide their choices not by a neutral con- 
sequentialist theory of right, but by other considerations, perhaps by 
agent-centered ones. 
A particularly good recent example of this position is advanced by 
Derek Parfit. After arguing against what he calls Common-Sense 
Morality as a theory of right because of its agent-centeredness, he then 
says that nonetheless "for most of us, the best dispositions would in the 
following sense roughly correspond to Common-Sense Morality. We 
should often be strongly disposed to act in the ways that this morality 
requires." 23 
But what is important in evaluating a consideration's status as right- 
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or wrong-making on the inside-out view just is whether persons should 
be guided by it in making their choices, or more precisely, whether a 
person of good character would be guided by it. The inside-out view 
refuses to make the sharp distinction between criteria of right and 
choice-guiding considerations. Indeed, it is worth asking what the force 
of the consequentialist's assertion that an act was wrong is, over and 
above its simply meaning that it produced less than optimal states of 
affairs, when he simultaneously asserts that considerations by which 
the person should have been guided recommended against the act and 
that the person was a better person for being so guided. That is, what is 
the force of asserting that not only did the act have less than optimal 
consequences, but also that, because of that, it was the wrong thing for 
the agent to have done? 24 
Even consequentialists agree that the considerations a person 
should be guided by likely include agent-centered restrictions. The 
"problem" of agent-centered restrictions does not arise for them at this 
level. The problem concerns whether, even though it is better that 
agents be guided by agent-centered restrictions, they do what is right 
when they are so guided. It arises here because if the rationale for a 
view of what a person should do is to be found in the intrinsic value of 
states of affairs, then it seems natural to conclude that what a person 
should do is whatever would bring about the best states. 
There are, of course, broadly consequentialist positions that deny 
that an act's being right depends in any simple way on the value of its 
consequences. Rule-consequentialists, for example, would roughly 
agree that since persons should be guided by agent-centered restric- 
tions, then they act rightly when so guided. They are thus likely to 
endorse agent-centered restrictions. But if the rationale offered for 
"indirectly" consequentialist normative positions is an outside-in one, 
if it is argued that inculcating the relevant agent-centered rules and 
motives will maximize valuable states, then the "problem" reemerges. 
What is directly at issue in a theory of conduct is what a person should 
do, and not, directly anyway, how people should be motivated or" 
guided in choice. So if the rationale adopted is outside-in, then a 
neutralist act-consequentialism seems better justified than any indirect 
consequentialist view. 
It is open, of course, for someone who pursues the outside-in 
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approach to define a concept of fight in the way Mill did, as connected 
to rule-governed practices of approbation and disapprobation. If the 
concept is so defined, then there may well be an outside-in rationale for 
a rule-consequentialist account of right that will include agent- 
centered restrictions. But with any such definition it will still be pos- 
sible to raise the further question whether a person should do what it 
would be right to do so defined. And if the fundamental rationale for 
holding a position on the latter question is outside-in, then any agent- 
centered response will seem problematic. 
The inside-out approach does not face the problem of agent- 
centered restrictions in the same way. While it is similar to indirect 
consequentialisms in holding that what a person should do depends on 
what considerations and principles a person of good character would 
be guided by, it differs from the latter, at least when the latter is 
grounded in an outside-in rationale, by not basing its theory of char- 
acter on a more fundamental view of objectively valuable states. Con- 
sequently the relation it asserts between principles a person of good 
character would be guided by and the rightness of acts is not liable to 
be undermined in the way indirectly consequentialisms are when their 
alleged support is outside-in. 
The Butler/Kant approach advances a fundamental theory of cI~ar- 
acter that is independent of any view of the intrinsic value of states of 
affairs. But if its formalist, or as I prefer to say, constitutionalist theory 
of character enables it to avoid self-undermining of the sort that 
threatens indirect consequentialisms derived from the outside-in, this 
very aspect seems to raise other serious problems, problems that I can 
no more than mention here. 
Quite apart from the plausibility of its account of character and 
moral integrity on the one hand, and of its claim of a fundamental 
responsibility to maintain integrity on the other, there is a serious 
question whether any rationale can be mounted from these for any 
specific theory of right, in particular for a theory of fight with speeific 
agent-centered restrictions. The problem is that if what is fundamental 
is a more or less formal or procedural ideal of moral judgment, together 
with the proposition that no person is bound by a principle unless she 
could in principle approve herself of or legislate it from a certain stand- 
point in a way that satisfies the procedural constraints, what reason is 
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there to think that any principles, much less any agent-centered ones, 
will on this basis be binding on all? 
Butler and Kant, of course, thought universal principles could be so 
grounded, but when we consider why they did we may be less con- 
fident. Butler seems to have rested his case on a common human 
nature, created by a God who, by making us so that "there are cer- 
tain ... actions, which are themselves approved or disapproved by 
mankind, abstracted from the consideration of their tendency to the 
happiness or misery of the world", "may have laid us under particular 
obligations. ''25 So, he thought, the existence of a general obligation of 
"fidelity," rests on fidelity's being universally approved, other things 
equal, and infidelity disapproved; or at least, on these judgments being 
universal when informed and reflectively considered in the appropri- 
ate way. 
Kant's case for universal principles of duty grounded in an ideal of 
moral judgment, on the other hand, depends at least in part on the 
unpromising idea that an act is wrong if its maxim cannot consistently 
be conceived to hold as a universal law. 26 But if the very existence of a 
practice of promising (Kant's example), is vulnerable to violations in 
such a way that it is simply impossible for everyone to make false 
promises whenever it would be to their advantage to make them, so 
also might the existence of some thoroughly repugnant practice (such 
as Rawls's example of "telishment") be vulnerable to universal 
departures under some similar condition. 27 It might be, for example, 
that individual officials find telishing innocents a burden they would 
often like to escape, and that if they all did so when it was to their 
advantage then it would be impossible for anyone to telish because the 
practice would collapse. But this hardly seems to provide any justifica- 
tion for thinking it wrong not to telish. 
Ignoring the "contradiction in thought" test in the Categorical 
Imperative, however, requires one to emphasize Kant's test of univer- 
sal legislation in the will. The relevant question then becomes whether 
one could rationally will, perhaps from a standpoint that is impartial 
between persons (the "kingdom of ends") that everyone be guided by a 
given principle. But what reason is there to expect universal agreement 
on principles here? 
Unlike Butler's, Kant's case for universal principles of right rests on 
316 S T E P H E N  L. D A R W A L L  
no controversial theses about a common human nature that could be 
expected to lead to universal agreement in reflectively informed and 
impartial attitude. But because it lacks this common basis the question 
arises why there is any determinate answer to the question, What 
principles would it be rational to choose persons be guided by when 
that choice is made from a standpoint that is impartial between them? 
The best hope for the Kantian project, it seems to me, is to pursue it 
in something like the way Rawls attempts in A Theory of Justice. 
Impartiality is modeled by a veil of ignorance and the basis for choice 
from this standpoint is then the agent's own interests as a rational and 
moral person. 28 
For this approach to provide a rationale for any principle of right, 
two things will have to be true. First, there must be interests that 
rational and moral persons have as such, relative to which a choice of 
principles behind a veil of ignorance can be more or less rational. 29 
And second, it must be the case that relative to those interests there are 
principles it is rational to choose from behind a veil of ignorance. Both 
of these assumptions are far from trivial, but it does not seem unlikely 
to me that there are agent-centered principles it would be rational to 
choose from this standpoint. 
A second problem concerns the relation of such principles, if there 
be any, to moral integrity. Even ifa specific principle is one it would in 
fact be rational to choose all to act on, it may nonetheless be one that a 
given individual's conscientious judgment conflicts with. The Kantian 
can presumably rule out cases where a person simply believes some- 
thing is a principle of right but has not herself genuinely embraced 
(legislated) it in the appropriate way. But what if she takes up the 
appropriate standpoint, or comes as close as can reasonably be ex- 
pected, and embraces a principle that conflicts with the one it would be 
rational for her to choose from that point of view? 
When this happens the person will apparently be under conflicting 
obligations on the inside-out approach. She will have a fundamental 
obligation to maintain moral integrity and hence not to act contrary to 
her own authentic moral views. On the other hand, if she does so she 
will contravene a principle of right grounded in a more adequate exer- 
cise of the capacity on which moral integrity depends. 
This second problem should not, it seems to me, be viewed as an 
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unwelcome consequence of  the inside-out approach. For surely it is a 
problem that is central to the moral life and not one we should expect a 
philosophical account of morality to explain away. Its oddness, if not 
its sting, may be eased by thinking of  principles of  right, on the inside- 
out view, as primarily addressed not to the question of  what a person 
should do when his own moral judgment on some issue is settled, but 
rather to the question of  what his judgment on that issue should be. But 
if a person has a settled, and authentically gained, view on some 
matter, it does seem a mistake to think that the question of  what he 
should then do is essentially unchanged. 
Agent-centered restrictions seem mysterious or essentially prob- 
lematic only when moral philosophy is approached from the outside- 
in. Whatever contribution of  disvalue an act makes to the world, how- 
ever bad it is, no rationale follows from that for refusing to perform it 
when doing so prevents more performances. 
The inside-out approach is not value-based, however. It is integrity- 
and character-based. If moral philosophy is approached in this way, 
the 'problem' of agent-centered restrictions dissolves in its outside-in 
form. 
NOTES 
I Two points should be kept in mind. First, I am assuming a consequentialist/deonto- 
logical distinction made with respect to the content of a theory of right. A theory is con- 
sequentialist if, and only if, it determines whether an aet is fight by whether the act maxi- 
mizes good consequences. Otherwise the theory is deontological. So rule-utilitarian 
would, for present purposes, count as a deontological theory. Consequentialism, in the 
present context, includes only act-consequentialist theories, 
Second, deontological theories may well include principles that are not agent-centered 
- for example, a prima facie principle of general harm prevention. The point is that any 
such principles could also be part ofa  consequentialist theory if it had a suitable theory of 
good. 
There is another way of making the consequentialist/deontological distinction, viz., 
with respect to a theory of right's underlying rationale. On that distinction any theory of 
right based on propositions about objective or impersonal value - that certain states of 
affairs are good or bad in a way that creates a reason for any person to promote them - is 
consequentialist. Deontological theories are those advanced without such a rationale. 
The "problem of agent-centered restrictions" is whether there exists any other rationale 
for a theory of right. 
2 This point is made by Judith Lichtenberg in her review of Scheffier's The Rejection of 
Consequentialism, 'The good, the right, and the all right', Yale Law Journal 92 (1983), 
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4 In addition to Scheffler, see Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford Uni- 
versity Press, 1984); Peter Railton, 'Alienation, consequentialism, and the demands of 
morality', Philosophy and Public Affairs 13 (1984), 134-171; and Donald Regan, 
Cooperative Utilitarianism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980). 
5 W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 16. 
6 G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), p. 147. 
7 C. D. Broad, 'Certain features in Moore's ethical doctrines', in The Philosophy ofG. E. 
Moore, ed. P.A. Schilpp (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1968), p. 46. Compare Parfit's 
definition that "agent-relative" principles or theories give "different agent different aims" 
(Reasons and Persons, p. 55). 
s Principia Ethica, p. 25. 
9 TheRightandtheGood, p. 19. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid.,p, 122. 
12 Bernard Williams, 'A critique of utilitarianism', in Utilitarianism: For and Against 
ICambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), p. 95. 
3 Thomas E. Hill, Jr., 'Self-respect reconsidered', in Respect for Persons, Tulane Studies 
in Philosophy v. xxxi, ed. O. H. Green (New Orleans, Tulane University, 1982), p. 130. 
14 Ibid.,p. 133. 
15 Bernard Williams, 'Persons, character, and morality', in Moral Luck (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981), esp. pp. 12f. See also the section titled 'Integrity' in 
'A critique of utilitarianism'. 
16 Joseph Butler, Five Sermons, ed. S. L. Darwall (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983), p. 66n. 
17 Because this view holds there to be no external standard of moral legislation, to put 
the point in Kantian terms, but only procedural and formal constraints of 'duly con- 
stituted' moral judgment, it is illuminating to describe it as constitutionalist. ('Constitu- 
tion' is a central Butlerian notion.) I discuss this aspect of the view in more detail in 
'Self-deception, autonomy, and moral constitution', in The Forms of Self-Deception, ed. 
B. McLaughlin and A. Rorty, University of California Press, forthcoming. 
18 The phrase comes from Paul's Letter to the Romans (II: 14). This passage provides the 
text for Butler's Sermon II and I|I. See Five Sermons, pp. 34-45 esp. p. 37. 
19 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of  Morals, trans. H.J.  Paton (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1964), p. 66; Preussische Akademie, p. 398. 
2o In this respect the Butler/Kant approach differs from what is often called an "ethics of 
virtue", such as Aristotle's, that might also be considered to be inside-out. It seems to me 
that "constitutionalist" projects such as Butler's and Kant's are purer cases of an inside- 
out approach since they do not include as essential any particular concern for states out- 
side of the moral agent within their ideal of moral character. They thus differ in this way 
from a view like Hutcheson's also. 
21 Whether states can be good in any purely objective or impersonal sense that provides 
any agent a justification to produce them, regardless of the agent's specific nature, is a 
completely different question than whether there can be facts of the matter about a state's 
being good for a person or group, or from a person or group's point of view. There might 
be objective values in this second sense even if there are none in the first. 
22 Butler, Five Sermons, p. 15. 
23 Reasons and Persons, p. 112. 
24 It is, of course, open to the consequentialist to hold as did Moore in Principia that the 
only fundamental ethical notion is that of intrinsic value. 
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I should also point out that what I say here does not take into account the possibility 
that the consequentialist's account of right might be held to coincide with an account of 
what considerations should guide the deliberations of a perfectly impartial cognizer, like 
Hare's archangel, though not the deliberations of us less than perfect decisionmakers. 
This suggestion has promise for some cases but not for others. See Hare, Moral Thinking 
fOxford: Oxford University Press, 1981). 
5 Butler, Five Sermons, p. 66n. 
26 Specifically, he held that the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties is to be 
explained by the difference between maxims that could not be conceived to hold as a 
universal law and those that could not be willed so to hold. See Groundwork, Ak. p. 424. 
27 In 'Two concepts of rules', PhilosophicalReview 64 (1955), 11-12. 
28 It is often complained that Rawls's original position cannot model Kant's 'realm of 
ends' because the choice behind the veil is one of instrumental rationality relative to self- 
interest. But the argument would be essentially unchanged if the parties were assumed to 
be completely self-sacrificing trustees for the interests (as rational person) of another 
person. The veil makes it impossible to tailor principles to any particular individual, so 
by assuming a concern for the rational interests of one person the standpoint effectively 
expresses a concern for an arbitrary, rather than any particular, person. 
I discuss this way of modelling Kant in 'Is there a Kantian interpretation of Rawlsian 
justice?', in John Rawls' Theory of Social Justice, ed. H.G.  Blocker and E. Smith 
(Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1980), pp. 311-345. 
29 The assumption that there are interests persons have as such plays a more prominent 
role in Rawls's writings since A Theory of Justice. In particular, see 'Kantian con- 
structivism in moral theory', The Journal of Philosophy 77 (1980), 525-527; and 'Social 
unity and primary goods', in Utilitarianism and Beyond, ed. A. Sen and B. Williams 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 164-165. Thus, from the latter: "In 
formulating a conception of justice for the basic structure of society, we start by viewing 
each person as a moral person moved by two highest-order interests, namely, the 
interests to realise and to exercise the two powers of moral personality. These two powers 
are the capacity for a sense of right and justice (the capacity to honaur fair terms of 
cooperation), and the capacity to decide upon, to revise and rationally to pursue a con- 
ception of the good". 
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